From Rallying Cry to Quiet Diplomacy: The Evolution of the R2P’s Purpose and Function
Dr Samuel Jarvis writes on the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect from ‘rallying cry’ to respond to cases of mass atrocity, to a focus on atrocity prevention and the use of ‘quiet diplomacy’. Dr Jarvis highlights the need to remain outspoken on issues of human protection in a changing global order.
Introduction
The concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has evolved significantly over recent decades and continues to be shaped by competing interests and values at the local, national and global level. This has, in turn, created a norm that is now connected to a much wider array of human protection responses, far beyond its initial intervention focus, such as refugee protection and the supply of humanitarian aid.
This shift has occurred during a time of changing global power dynamics in which a more pluralist agenda is being pushed by rising powers, one in which respect for sovereign equality remains vehemently defended. Consequently, the pivot to expand what it means to implement the R2P has also notably lead to a much less vocal and less collective approach to mobilisation, in which ‘least worst’ solutions and the use of ‘quiet diplomacy’ are increasingly persuaded as a way to avoid greater tensions between major powers. In reflecting on what this might mean for the future trajectory of the R2P norm, this blog piece will briefly trace the evolution of the R2P’s function over time and highlight why the prevention of mass atrocity crimes will now, more than ever, require states to work collectively and be outspoken in confronting and challenging violations of human rights and mass atrocity crimes.
Debating the R2P’s Core Function
One of the principal architects behind the creation of the R2P, Gareth Evans, argued that the concept was originally devised to function as a “new rallying cry”, one which would be able to trigger international collective action and thus convert shock into policy response. In this sense, the R2P could work in elevating particular crises above the noise of regular international politics.
This conceptualisation of the R2P as a catalyst for action was subsequently framed in opposition to previous incidents of state inaction in the face of mass atrocity crimes, whereby the potential future success of the R2P was now seen to be measured by the decisiveness of the global response to the “next conscience-shocking case of large scale killing”.
Yet this particular vision of the R2P as a distinct motivator for action was subsequently challenged by several R2P scholars. Most notably Alex Bellamy, who instead frames the R2P as a “habit former”, one which influences states to begin internalising the goals of human protection alongside their domestic priorities. Rather than a rallying cry for generating additional political will, the R2P is argued to be a diplomatic tool that can help guide efforts in response to potential mass atrocities.
It is this line of argument that led Bellamy to claim that the primary goal of the R2P must be the prevention of mass atrocity crimes occurring in the first place whereby the key long-term test is “whether there are fewer cases of mass killing to respond to”. Thus, to avoid the potential for contextual variables to exert a greater impact on whether consensus for intervention is agreed or not, prevention must become the R2P’s defining goal.
Prevention in a Changing Global Order
From a rhetorical perspective, the R2P’s shift to a prevention focus has been met with almost universal support from UN member states, particularly those who wish to see the R2P move towards a more state-centric and demand-driven focus. However, it is also increasingly clear that prevention itself is complex and often no less controversial than other protection responses. As a result, any assumption that a shift to prevention would lead to less contestation over authorising protection practices has so far failed to match up with reality.
Furthermore, it remains the case that states still view many prevention initiatives as including inherently interventionist and intrusive aspects, that are ultimately seen to represent outside involvement in the internal affairs of the state. Against this backdrop is also a growing push back against human rights monitoring across many parts of the UN system. Subsequently, one can point to a renewed emphasis on the importance of so-called ‘quiet diplomacy’ techniques as an effective way of delivering an R2P response. The approach of Indonesia to the significant ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people in Myanmar provides a useful example of this practice.
Central to the appeal of quiet diplomacy is therefore a strong emphasis on the importance of equal sovereignty and thus a conscious decision to avoid public naming and shaming of the state involved. Furthermore, to facilitate support for those on the ground, quiet diplomacy has also been used to help negotiate the provision of humanitarian aid as one way of implementing the R2P.
This more humanitarian approach has thus been praised as an important pragmatic answer to situations in which the room for maneuverer is severely limited. Ralph and Gifkins underline the success of elective UNSC members in negotiating humanitarian access in Syria as an important example of this strategy. Yet as Jennifer Welsh has also rightly highlighted, there is still a longer-term risk that this kind of response ends up watering down what is meant by protection under the R2P norm. Moreover, as James Pattison has argued, the use of diplomatic criticism must still be seen as central to reinforcing the norms overall legitimacy. By not staying silent, states play a crucial role in calling attention to potential violations, highlighting why certain crimes must concern all states.
Consequently, when it comes to the challenge of improving the R2P’s record as a tool of prevention, recognising and calling out serious human rights abuses that may potentially lead to future atrocity crimes must remain central to the R2P’s strategy, even when this may initially generate considerable reproach. Critical to addressing this challenge is also working to develop the effectiveness of more creative forums for early discussion of potential human rights issues, such as the use of Aria formula meetings, when negotiations in the Security Council are stifled. The long-term danger for the R2P and its effectiveness as a prevention tool is that the space for vocal criticism shrinks further to avoid what some states see as an intrusion into their internal affairs. Whilst quiet diplomacy can prove effective in certain circumstances it must not at the same time become an excuse for states who might be less willing to call out potential atrocities in order to protect other national interests. The growing criticism of human rights in the UN has subsequently reinforced this urgent need for stronger collective support for human protection norms and the critical importance of vocal leadership in this area.
Conclusion
In 2013 Melissa Labonte posed the question as to why humanitarian assistance and humanitarian diplomacy were so often used as substitutes for political will, particularly when stronger measures would be legitimate and responsible when trying to halt mass atrocity crimes. In light of the UN’s recent failures in responding to crises, such as in Myanmar, this question arguably appears even more prescient today. Whilst Evans’ original rallying cry appeal no longer reflects the focus of the norm, the shift to prevention must not at the same time remove the importance of vocal and collective leadership that at times will challenge aspects of sovereign integrity.
For the R2P to work more effectively as a tool of prevention it will still require states to raise their head above the noise to voice concerns and be outspoken, despite the initial push back. Prevention can thus only be as strong as those who are willing to speak up for it. If the R2P is to have a longer-term future it must still strive to provide more than just quiet diplomacy or humanitarianism under a different label.
Dr Samuel Jarvis is a lecturer in international relations at York St. John University, UK.
Title image: UN Geneva, United Nations Day. https://www.flickr.com/photos/51848516@N02/4884956247. No changes were made to the original image.
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