Trust Me, We Need Trust Studies to Aid Mass Atrocity Prevention
Professor Adrian Gallagher of ECR2P calls for deeper engagement with the concept of trust in academic literature and policymaking strategies on mass atrocity prevention.
Surveying the literature on mass atrocities (defined as genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes) and mass atrocity prevention strategies, it is striking just how many fleeting references to trust, mistrust, and distrust there are, yet at the same time there is no in-depth engaging with these concepts or Trust Studies.
Research on mass atrocities throughout history reveal the multidimensional role that trust and distrust have played. Sémelin argues that one of the most fundamental causes of mass violence is distrust as collective memories are forged and manipulated into thinking that ‘[i]t is from THEM that all our suffering arises. We cannot trust them. Those people are not like US’.[1] The victim group is identified as untrustworthy because of historical events (whether real or not). From this perspective, it is better to strike now to prevent the group in question from inflicting anymore harm.
During the ‘Mytilenean Debate’ (427 BC) over whether all men, women, and children should be exterminated, it was argued that their betrayal of the Athenians represented a ‘serious breach of trust’ and that only ‘violent retaliation’ could address this.[2] The ‘religious cleansing’ of Spain in the early 17th century is said to have taken place because ‘a court faction argued successfully that new Jewish and Moorish converts could not be trusted’.[3] In Rwanda Hutu extremists saw what was taking place in Burundi and concluded ‘you can’t trust the “Inyenzi” (cockroaches)?’ which paved the way for the genocide in 1994.[4] Non-state armed groups have also utilised such logic, in Iraq, Al-Qaeda’s number two, Zawahiri wrote to Aby Musab al-Zarqawi warning that ‘Shi’a Muslims could never be trusted’.[5]
If distrust is one side of the coin, trust is the other as perpetrators identify themselves as trustworthy and doing the right thing as they orchestrate mass atrocities against those that they say cannot be trusted. For example, the violent European seizure of resources in Africa in the 18th and 19th century was defended on the grounds that Europeans could establish a ‘trust for civilisation’ which would benefit ‘mankind’.[6] In other words, the so-called ‘enlightened’ Europeans could be trusted to use the resources for the greater good whereas Africans could not be trusted to do the same.
The problem with these studies is that other than the fleeting references to trust and distrust, there is no further engagement with the concepts. Time and time again, therefore, studies seemingly identify distrust as a significant factor when writing about key enablers such as dehumanisation within the context of destruction processes, but this does no more than scratch the surface. As far as this author is aware, there has been no engagement with Trust Studies despite the interdisciplinary nature of both studies on mass atrocities and on trust. As a result, the authors do not get to grips with fundamental issues such as the meaning of trust and distrust, the relationship between them or the multidimensional character of the concepts themselves.[7] This seems critical if we are to better understand the trust/distrust dynamics that it would appear play an important role in destruction processes.
When it comes to policymaking, the mainstream approach appears to be that peace talks and national dialogues are a way of rebuilding trust in order to foster peace. To consider this further let us turn to the United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes which identifies 14 risk factors and 143 indicators.[8] Breaking these down, trust is identified as an indicator on two occasions in relation to different risks. First, risk factor factor two, ‘[r]ecord of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law’ embodies eight indicators, including ‘[w]idespread mistrust in State institutions or among different groups as a result of impunity’.[9] This indicator speaks to both political trust and social trust as mistrust in ‘the State’ as well as between groups is viewed as a catalyst. The UN is asking actors (states, civil society etc) to identify where mistrust exists, monitor it, and work to reduce its potential for facilitating mass atrocities.
The second indicator relating to trust in the UN’s framework is evident in risk factor thirteen, ‘[s]erious threats to those protected under international humanitarian law’, which embodies 12 indicators including ‘[m]istrust between opposing parties based on past or present breaches of commitments or agreements’.[10] The indicator reflects the emotional character of mistrust as it may be present because of historical betrayal. On this point it should be noted that the Framework uses the term ‘mistrust’ as opposed to ‘distrust’ which aligns with many statements made by UN representatives but yet it is unclear as to whether they are using the term mistrust intentionally or not, and if so, what exactly is the difference between mistrust and distrust? This is something that academics working on trust are grappling with yet there is no evidence that policymakers are not simply conflating different terms. Putting this to one side, the logic embodied in the UN approach feeds back into Sémelin’s view that perceptions of distrust may facilitate mass atrocities: it is better to perpetrate violence against them before they do it to us, after all, they cannot be trusted.
The problem with the United Nations approach is three-fold. First, it assumes trust existed, broke down, and can be rebuilt. From this perspective, it is trying to fix or resolve a crisis in trust, the thinking being that if individuals or groups have lost trust in the state or each other then external intervention can help fix this. Problematically, this fails to consider that trust may never have existed in the manner implied. If so, we should not view this as a breakdown in trust that can be fixed because high levels of trust did not exist in the first place.
Second, and linked to the first point, the UN approach fails to consider the normative value of distrust.[11] There may be very good reasons why individuals or groups distrust the State, each other, or external actors. This is not to suggest that trust cannot be forged between enemies,[12] but that at the domestic level, within the context of ‘extremely violent societies’,[13] trusting an actor such as the government could be ‘silly self-exposure’.[14]
Third, the UN approach does not take into account that the very actors involved – the UN, Western states, and even civil society organisations – may be viewed with distrust precisely because of their actions in the past and/or present. For example, the fact that United Nations peacekeepers have perpetrated horrendous crimes undoubtedly fuels distrust in the very organisation that victims may have hoped would bring peace rather than suffering.[15] Accordingly, how can agents, who may be viewed as untrustworthy, build trust? Even if, therefore, the problem is a breakdown in trust, it may be that the actors identified to build trust cannot because they themselves are not trusted.
Although one cannot go into any more depth in such a short blog post, hopefully, the paradox has been illustrated. On one hand, we have countless references to the importance of trust, mistrust, and distrust in academic literature and policymaking strategies yet on the other, there is very little engagement with the meaning, relationship, or multifaceted nature of these concepts. If we learn lessons from the interdisciplinary research underpinning Trust Studies, then this will undoubtedly sharpen our thinking and in turn, may sharpen the tools needed to help prevent mass atrocities in the 21st century. This is needed both at the international level, as we analyse trust within institutions such as the United Nations Security Council,[16] and at the domestic level, as we analyse the role of trust, mistrust, and distrust within states, as well as the relationship in-between the national and the international.[17]
About the author
Adrian Gallagher is a Professor in Global Security and Mass Atrocity Prevention in School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Leeds. He is also co-director of the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Editor of the journal Global Responsibility to Protect. In January 2021 he started a 2.5 year project ‘Explaining Non-State Armed Groups Perpetrating Mass Atrocities’ with Dr Kaisa Hinkkainen (University of Leeds) which is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (£500,000). It focuses on six cases: Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.
If you are interested in submitting a blog post for the ECR2P’s Fresh Perspectives series, then please contact Dr Richard Illingworth by Email (r.illingworth@leeds.ac.uk) or Twitter (@RJI95).
References:
[1] Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. 2007. p. 77.
[2] Hans Van Wees, ‘Genocide in the Ancient World’, in Donald. Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, Eds. The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013, 239-259, p. 254.
[3] Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2005. p. 48.
[4] Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 140.
[5] Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. Yale University Press, 2009. p. 600.
[6] A. Dirk Moses, The Problem of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 122
[7] See Vincent Charles Keating, Lucy M Abbott, ‘Entrusted norms: security, trust, and betrayal in the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis’, European Journal of International Relations, 27 4 2021:1090-1113. Karen Jones, Trust, distrust, and affective looping. Philos Stud 176, 2019: 955–968. Also, Russel Hardin, Ed. Distrust. Russell Sage Foundation, 2009.
[8] United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, United Nations Office on the Prevention of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity 2014.
[9] Ibid, p. 11.
[10] Ibid, p. 22.
[11] Anette Baier, ‘Trust and Antitrust’, Ethics. 96 2 (1986) 231-260
[12] Nicholas J. Wheeler. Trusting Enemies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[13] Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2015.
[14] Baier, Trust and Antitrust, p. 293
[15] Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, Violating Peace. Cornell University Press. 2020.
[16] Adrian Gallagher and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Trust or Perish? The Responsibility to Protect and Use of Force in a Changing World Order’. Ethics & International Affairs. 35 2, 2021. pp. 181-195
[17] Adrian Gallagher, untitled working paper, forthcoming.